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'11a the Supreme Co1rt tf the State of Utah
t' . l~li·:~
.

:\ll)~ ...\UIL.\~.
Plnintiff and Rt.l~rPlllk~Jt.

YS

T. G.

AL.8X~\XDLH.

Deft:Andaut nnd

~\ppt:llltli<.

Hl·~I-•tllltieut ·~ ~tatement of the la\\· ut d~tnl~l~L~ n~
( ont~i.illt'ti in the last paraghaph of his briL• f e(d tHo t i.lc
ii.CC't-lJld..l 1.15 a ::--afe criterion "~ithout the q u;.diiici.l1i· •I land funitatiOll5 USUally emboJied therein.
rrhe rule HS
set forth in Oorpu~ Juris i~ as fc~lo\\-:-:: · 'sttated in
broad te1·m~. however, the measure of damages is :· ~: 1 ll
sum a5 will compensate the person injured foi· tiw L) :;-;
sustained, ''ith the least burden to the wrong-llo(_•r coHsistent with th2 idea of fair compensation, and \\Titlt
the duty upon the person injured to ~xercise rt·asonable care to mitigate the injury!' according to the oppor~ tnnities that may fairly be or appear to be \\ri thin hi:-;
reach,. and the same rule obtains whether the lo:-::; ::-claimed for injury to property~ personal injury~ o1·
be measured by something "y hich ''rill measure th <•
pecuniary loss, and the measure to be applied mu~t L~·
[ a real and tangible one." (17 C. J. 844)
breach of contract! since the only compensation whith
( the law can compel is a compensation in money, it n1ust
..

l~nder

the appropriate subheading dealiHg with
contracts the measure of damage ·on a basis of mui'l~{:t
value is in harmony with our statutory rule set out in
appellant's brief, (17 C. J. 866 including note 25.)
Respondent contends that market value cannot be
applied as a measure of damage in this case for thr-:
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reason that along with the sale of the hay is inclu?eu
pasturage am.d the use of corrals and .sheds for fe~d1~g,
all for the lump sum of $1200.00, w1thout spec1fyrng
what part for pasturage, etc. Why should. that] n1ake
any difference so long as the full- $1200.00 1s deaucted
from the total damages~
Market value does not enter into the question of deductions but is a limitation
and measure as to allowable expenditures. Assuming
that the market value of the hay was $6.00 per ton and
that respondent paid $10.00 per ton, our contention
is that the market price, six dollars, and not the
amount paid, ten dollars, should be used in ascertaining whether there has been am.y damage. We submit
that a mere statement of what plaintiff paid for hay
,\·ithout any showing rus to when he bought or what the
n1arket price 'vas when he should have bought, is
"rholly insufficient so far as the evidence is concerned.
He· is not relieved from his duty to exercise reasonable
care to mitigate the injury merely because the price of
hay is not separately stated in the contract. The only
difference is that in case of a partial breach \vhere the
consideration is a gross sum the plaintiff has am additional burden of showing the amount of consideration apportionable to the part of the contract alleged
to have been breached, (See 61 A L R 94 ''C. "\Vhere
consideration is in gross,'' being a part of an exhaustive
annotation on ''Damages for Breach of 9ovenants of
Title" in which general rules of damages are also
applied.)
In the case of Duggins vs Colby (145 Pacific 1042,
45 Utah 335,) case directly in point, the judgment of
the lo,ver Court was reversed on acount of the failure
of the lower Court to determine the market value.
''The trial Court should not make a finding of
fact \vhere there is no evidence to support it and its
ju~gmen~ ~her~on will be reversed.''
Hathway ys
lTnited T1nt1c l\f1nes Company (132 Pacifis 388).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the pre8ent t'n~t_\ the plaintiff ~ul.nuittt~d 't hnld
~tntement of hi~ l''xpenditun\s givt..\n in tht.• fortn t.)l' l'Ollt..'lnBitnl~ 'lnd rt..\~tt\d hi~ en~t1 "·ithout n Wt.lrtl of tt~sti, mony a~ to the mnrkt..\t Ynlue ot' tht..• hny nud t ht• 11a:-:t urngt:\ eoYered by tht.._\ contrnl't.
.:\ llh'n\ ~tatt.·nlPUt iu
the t(\~timony that the plniutiff w n~ l'LHllpt.•llt'd tn nullH•
certain expenditnrt\~ and that tht.• t.•xpenst.•s Wt'rt.' llL't.'essary cannot be equivalent to h:\~timony a~ to tltt.• lll~u·
kt'~t \alue of the hay and pn~t urag·t\. ( 17 l )·e. 2U~l) 1f lH'
''as compelled to nutke the expeuditurt..\~ for tht..~ rt.·~i:->on
thnt he purchased it at the market prit•e hP ~hould ha·\"ll
stated sr'.
If on thtl otht..·r hand hP ,,-a~ <:OlllPL'llt•d to
pay more than the maTket price becau~e of his dL·structive manner of using the leased premises " . . bert> the feeding was to haYe been done. as cutting expensiYe fences,
and killing out the hay, the price "~ffich he "·ns conlpelled to pay could not be accepted as evidence of market value.
X or can the need for a direct showing as to market value be dispensed with by a mere conclusion that
the h~~·y was t~)ught at the cheapest possible expense.
So many elements foreign to the question of market
value may enter into -such a conclusion as for instance:
inefficiency, lack of diligence, or personal misfortune
9f the purchaser.
H such were the rule the party
claiming to have been injured could delay his purchase
until the price became unreasonably high indifferent
as to the rise in price so long as the expense could be
charged to the other party.
There is only o~e just and fair rule for the measnrement of the damages in such cases and that is the
market price as provided by our statute.
The fact
that the question of cheapness alone is not a safe rule,
is clearly shown by plaintiff's testimony on that particular point as recited on page seven of the abstract.
For the third- year of the contract his expenditures
_were $3,044.75 on a Twelve Hundred Dollar Contract.
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As to the next year he says: '' rrhe fourth year I did
my best to cut that down-get the hay cheaper.
2\Iy .
expenses amounted to only $1551.00. ''
"'
We submit that in view of the fact that there is
no evidence whats-oever that the prices paid were the
market price and no finding on the question of market
value that the judgment should he set aside and the
case remanded for new trial.

Respectfully submitted,

WALLACE CALDER,
Attorney for Appellant .
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